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CHALLENGING LAND USE ACTIONS UNDER SECTION
1983: WASHINGTON LAW AFTER MISSION SPRINGS,
INC. v. CITY OF SPOKANE
Eric Jenkins
Abstract: Federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a cause of action against persons who
use state or local law to deprive individuals of constitutional rights. Federal circuit courts have
been reluctant to apply § 1983 to commonplace land use grievances because of the local
character of land use planning and a belief that only the most egregious misuse of zoning
power can implicate a party's substantive due process rights. To limit the number of claims
that can be brought under § 1983, the federal circuits have narrowly defined what property
rights are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and have held that allegations of due
process violations must be based on more than the arbitrary and capricious denial of land use
permits. The Washington Supreme Court has struggled to determine an appropriate standard
to apply to § 1983 land use claims. In Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, the court
departed from its previous adherence to a stricter standard derived from the federal circuits.
This Note examines the implications of that decision and argues that the stricter standards
applied in the federal circuits are appropriate for § 1983 land use claims. Section 1983 was
intended to protect fundamental constitutional rights rather than to provide a means of
transforming distinctly local matters into federal constitutional claims.
In 1995 the Spokane City Council voted to delay issuance of building
and grading permits associated with developer Mission Springs's
previously approved Planned Unit Development (PUD)? Citing the long
delay between PUD approval and permit application and the need to
reexamine potential traffic problems, the Spokane City Council decided
to commission a traffic study before granting final approval for the
permits.2 In so doing, the city council ignored advice given by the
Spokane City Attorney that its actions would amount to a charter
violation and possibly give rise to liability under state and federal law.3
Mission Springs responded by filing suit in state court, alleging that the
Spokane City Council's actions violated both state law and federal
statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4
Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane5 is representative of a class of
local land use claims often brought under § 1983. Section 1983 is a
1. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 952-54, 954 P.2d 250, 252-
53 (1998).
2. See id. at 955-57, 954 P.2d at 253-54.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 951, 954 P.2d at 250.
5. 134 Wash. 2d 947,954 P.2d 250.
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Reconstruction Era statute prohibiting persons from using state law to
deprive individuals of rights protected by the U.S. Constitution.6 As in
Mission Springs, the federal issue in § 1983 land use actions is usually a
claimed violation of either the due process or equal protection provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Although the asserted federal interest is
often tenuous at best, the benefits of litigating under § 1983 provide a
powerful incentive to pursue claims under federal law.'
Federal circuit courts have been reluctant to extend federal law to
encompass routine disputes over land use permits.9 This attitude reflects
not only the distinctly local character of zoning, but also a trend in
federal jurisprudence away from providing substantive due process
protection to all but a narrow strand of fundamental rights.'0 To limit
litigation of land use claims under § 1983, federal circuit courts have
adopted strict tests for determining what property rights are worthy of
Fourteenth Amendment protection," and they have narrowly defined the
government misconduct that can support a substantive due process
claim.' 2 The First Circuit has held that § 1983 will be available to those
aggrieved by a local land use decision only if the violation of due process
is so egregious as to be "shocking or violative of universal standards of
decency.'
13
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide § 1983
claims.' 4 Washington courts, like the federal circuits, have struggled to
define the circumstances under which a local land use dispute can give
rise to a federal cause of action.' 5 Although at times the Washington
State Supreme Court has applied standards derived from the federal
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
7. See Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 963-64, 954 P.2d at 257-58.
8. In addition to providing the option of litigating in a federal forum, § 1983 actions provide for
the award of attorney fees and enable individuals to pursue damages against decisionmakers in their
individual capacities. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1994).
9. See Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 757 (1st Cir. 1990).
10. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that extension
of substantive due process to economic and property rights has been largely discredited).
11. See, e.g., Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir.
1991); Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1985).
12. See, e.g., Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992); Creative
Env'ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982).
13. Amsden, 904 F.2d at 757.
14. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988).
15. See, e.g., Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992);
R/L Assocs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402, 780 P.2d 838 (1989).
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circuits, in other cases the court has examined § 1983 claims using a
standard of review derived from the state administrative law context. 6
This Note examines the impact of the Washington State Supreme
Court's decision in Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane7 on
Washington case law relating to § 1983. Part I briefly describes § 1983
and the Due Process Clause, examines the treatment of § 1983 in the
federal circuits, and discusses Washington's treatment of § 1983 prior to
Mission Springs. Part II considers the facts and holding of Mission
Springs. Part I analyzes the effect of Mission Springs and concludes
that it draws an already inconsistent body of case law further into conflict
with the approaches federal courts have taken to § 1983. Finally, Part IV
argues that Washington should adopt a stricter standard than that used in
Mission Springs.
I. FEDERAL AND STATE ANALYSIS OF § 1983 CLAIMS
A. Section 1983
Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.8 Known widely as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, § 1983 was
intended to provide a federal cause of action against persons attempting
to use state law to deprive others of rights guaranteed by the federal
constitution. 9 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, or suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.20
16. See infra notes 85, 88, and accompanying text.
17. 134 Wash. 2d 947,954 P.2d 250 (1998).
18. Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 1, 7 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994));
see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,97 (1980).
19. See Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 979,954 P.2d at 265-66.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Section 1983 does not itself confer additional substantive rights, but
rather serves as a vehicle by which individuals can seek redress for the
violation of federal constitutional rights elsewhere conferred.2
B. The Due Process Clause
The application of § 1983 to land use issues is made possible by the
Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that individuals not be deprived of
liberty or property without due process.22 The Due Process Clause not
only mandates adherence to minimum procedures when government
action infringes upon property or personal liberty, but also contains a
substantive component that prohibits certain types of arbitrary or
unreasonable government conduct no matter what procedures are used.23
Land use claims brought under § 1983 usually involve allegations that
arbitrary application of local zoning laws violated a property owner's
substantive due process rights. 4
Substantive due process has been widely condemned as a "treacherous
field"'  in which the limits of judicial intervention too often depend
merely upon the predilections of individual judges.2 6 This attitude
reflects a pronounced shift in federal jurisprudence since the era of
Lochner v. New York, during which an activist Court often invalidated
even purely economic legislation on substantive due process grounds.27 It
is now well established that substantive due process defines only the
extreme outer limits of government conduct.28 Government action
violates substantive due process only if it "offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental., 29 Recent U.S. Supreme Court substantive due
21. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
22. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law").
23. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1220 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Zinermon
v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).
24. See Creative Env'ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982) (characterizing
typical land use case as one involving allegations of misapplication of local zoning laws).
25. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
26. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
27. See Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1318.
28. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,202 (1977).
29. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)).
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process decisions have focused on protecting "matters relating to
marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity." 30
C. Federal Approaches to Land Use Claims Under § 1983
While the federal circuits have myriad approaches to hearing
substantive due process claims, all agree that the use of substantive due
process to reach land use decisions under § 1983 should be strictly
limited.3 This restrictive philosophy is based on the notion that zoning is
principally a matter of local concern and that only the most egregious
abuse of a local entity's zoning powers can rise to the level of a
substantive due process violation.32 The federal circuits follow two
principal approaches in limiting the number of land use claims that can
be brought under § 1983. One group of circuits, led by the Second
Circuit, concentrates on narrowly defining what property interests are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The remaining circuits, while
recognizing that a protected property right must be involved, focus their
analysis on the government action that gives rise to due process
concerns.34 Under this approach, the challenged action does not violate
the U.S. Constitution unless it is "shocking to the conscience," "truly
irrational," or generally on a wholly different level than the conduct
required to set aside an administrative agency decision as arbitrary or
35capricious. 5
30. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,271-72 (1994).
31. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992) (summarizing approaches
of all circuits to entertaining challenges to land use decisions under § 1983).
32. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1222.
33. See, e.g., Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir.
1991); Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54,59 (2d Cir. 1985).
34. See, e.g., G.M. Eng'rs & Assocs. v. West Bloomfield Township, 922 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir.
1990); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988); Creative
Env'ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982).
35. See Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1221 (noting that arbitrary and capricious in constitutional sense has
entirely different meaning than it has in state administrative law context).
Washington Law Review
1. Circuits That Narrowly Define Property Interests
The Second Circuit has been highly influential in defining what
property interests are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.36 The
"clear entitlement" test used in the Second Circuit recognizes a property
right in a sought-after land use permit only if the discretion of the issuing
authority is so narrowly circumscribed that, absent arbitrary conduct,
issuance of the permit is virtually certain.37 In Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v.
Johnson, the Second Circuit dismissed a claim involving denial of a
permit to operate an automobile junkyard, finding that the licensing
authorities had discretion to deny the permit.38 The existence of
discretion defeated the applicant's claimed property right in the permit
and led the court to dismiss the plaintiff's claim despite acknowledging
egregious misconduct by the defendants.39
A claim of entitlement sufficient to constitute a protected property
interest must be distinguished from mere unilateral expectations of
favorable action on the part of permit applicants. While state law gives
permit applicants the right to expect that discretion in the permit
application process will be exercised consistently, federal law does not
automatically confer a similar right.4" The simple fact that relevant
factors and past practices create an expectation that discretion is likely to
be favorably exercised is insufficient to create a property right protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.4" If the sought-after permit could be
denied on nonarbitrary grounds, a federal substantive due process claim
is foreclosed by the "clear entitlement" test, whatever the true motives of
the decisionmakers.42
36. See, e.g., RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 915-18
(2d Cir. 1989); Jacobs, 927 F.2d at 1116. For cases citing Second Circuit precedent, see New
Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir. 1990), and
Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 259 (11 th Cir. 1989).
37. See Yale Auto Parts, 758 F.2d at 59.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1221 (explaining that while state court can set aside zoning decision
as arbitrary or capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence, "arbitrary or capricious" in
federal constitutional sense is much narrower inquiry).
41. See RRIRealty Corp., 870 F.2d at 918.
42. See id.
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Key Ninth Circuit land use decisions suggest a correlation between the
Ninth Circuit approach to § 1983 and that of the Second Circuit.43 Like
the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit emphasizes defining what
constitutes a property right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment' A
claimant establishes a "legitimate claim of entitlement" in the Ninth
Circuit if the statutory scheme for permit issuance places "significant
substantive restrictions on the decision to grant a permit or license."4
Just how narrowly circumscribed the discretion of the issuing authority
must be, however, is not entirely clear. Bateson v. Geisse, the leading
Ninth Circuit land use case, involved a situation in which issuance of a
permit was mandatory upon the satisfaction of specified criteria." The
existence of some discretion on the part of issuing authorities will likely
not negate a claimed property right in a land use permit.47 The Ninth
Circuit appears to have suggested in Bateson that a property right exists
when the statutory scheme is sufficiently detailed such that the right to
the permit is clearly established and a decisionmaker would understand
the right is being violated. Some state courts, however, have interpreted
the Ninth Circuit approach to be nearly as restrictive as that used in the
Second Circuit.49
If a legitimate claim of entitlement is demonstrated, the Ninth Circuit
requires that the government action in question be "irrational or
arbitrary" to violate the due process clause. 0 The "subjective good faith"
of the issuing authority is not relevant to the question of whether a due
process violation has occurred, and there is no requirement that the
challenged action shock the conscience or be invidiously motivated.5
43. After Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996), there remains some question of
whether the Ninth Circuit's approach to land use claims brought under § 1983 will change,
especially in light of the Armendariz court's statement that "the use of substantive due process to
extend constitutional protection to economic and property rights has been largely discredited." Ma. at
1318-19 (citations omitted).
44. See Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1305 (9th Cir. 1988).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 1303.
47. See id. at 1304-05.
48. See id. at 1304.
49. See Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 240-41 (1996).
50. See Bateson, 857 F.2d at 1303.
51. See id. at 1304.
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2. Circuits Focusing on Government Conduct
Although recognizing that a protected property right must be at issue
to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, a number of circuits limit the
application of § 1983 in land use cases by focusing on the conduct that
gives rise to the due process claim rather than relying solely on a "clear
entitlement" test. 2 The common element of these approaches is that a
challenged action does not violate substantive due process unless the
decisionmaking was motivated by factors unrelated to land use
planning.13 There is not, however, a uniform approach for determining
how unrelated to land use planning a motive for decisionmaking must be
to fail the rationality test. While the First Circuit's standard is a virtual
bar to substantive due process actions,54 the Third Circuit has shown a
greater willingness to entertain land use claims under § 1983."
a. Conduct That Shocks the Conscience: The First Circuit's Approach
The essence of the First Circuit's position is that zoning disputes
should be resolved under state law and cannot be transformed into
federal constitutional claims by labeling the challenged action as a
violation of "due process" or "equal protection."56 In Creative
Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, the First Circuit suggested that every
appeal of a land use decision necessarily involves some claim of
disparate treatment or abuse of power." Even when coupled with
demonstrated violations of state law, however, an abuse of zoning
authority will seldom give rise to a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
52. See infra notes 56, 64, 68, 72, and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., New Burnham Prairie Homes v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th Cir.
1990); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988); Bello v.
Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988).
54. See Creative Env'ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982).
55. See, e.g., DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1991); Bello, 840
F.2d at 1129.
56. See Creative Env'ts, 680 F.2d at 833. The Sixth Circuit also follows the "shocks the
conscience" standard. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992).
57. See id.
58. See id.
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To violate the First Circuit's standard, the challenged action must be
"egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking."59 A bad
faith refusal to abide by state law is insufficient by itself to raise a
substantive due process claim.' In Licari v. Feruzzi,61 the First Circuit
gave some indication of what might be necessary to state a claim under
§ 1983. For purposes of the appeal, the court accepted as true that the
municipal authority's actions amounted to a hostile attempt to coerce the
plaintiff to reduce the size of its development.62 Nonetheless, the court
held that the plaintiff's § 1983 claim would be valid only if the
municipality's actions had been directed at immutable characteristics
such as religion or political affiliation.63
b. "Invidious or Irrational" Conduct: The Seventh Circuit's Approach
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Coniston Corp. v. Village of
Hoffman Estates reveals that its "invidious or irrational" standard is
similar in restrictiveness to the First Circuit's approach.64 In Coniston,
members of the city council sought to protect owners of existing office
buildings from new competition by voting against a proposed
development project.6' The Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's
§ 1983 claim and held that a violation of state or local law does not often
rise to the level of a federal due process violation.' The court noted that
the only example it had previously given of a zoning decision that would
constitute "invidious or irrational" behavior, and therefore reach § 1983,
was one-based on race.67
c. "Arbitrary or Irrational" Conduct: Other Circuits 'Approaches
Several circuits have developed "arbitrary or irrational" standards that
are somewhat less hostile to § 1983 claims than the First Circuit or
59. Licari v. Feruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 347 (Ist Cir. 1994).
60. See PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriquez, 928 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Chiplin Enters.
v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d 1524, 1528 (1st Cir. 1983)).
61. 22 F.3d 344.
62. See id. at 349.
63. See id.
64. 844 F.2d 461,467 (7th Cir. 1988).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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Seventh Circuit approaches. Use of the "arbitrary or irrational"
terminology has focused on whether there is a rational relationship
between the challenged decision and a legitimate zoning goal.6" For
example, the Eighth Circuit suggested in Bituminous Materials, Inc. v.
Rice County that using zoning authority to punish a political opponent or
denying a business license to protect the decisionmaker's competing
business might qualify as truly irrational action.69 The court stressed,
however, that the "arbitrary or irrational" test is intended to be highly
restrictive and limited to those situations in which the challenged action
is truly irrational.70 Violations of state or local law do not alone qualify
as truly irrational action.7'
The Third Circuit has been more willing than the Eighth Circuit to
entertain land use claims under § 1983, yet even its "arbitrary or
irrational" standard requires government action based on personal factors
unrelated to land use planning. In Bello v. Walker,72 the Third Circuit
upheld a § 1983 claim based on municipal officials' interference with
issuance of a land use permit for personal political reasons.73 This
personal motive was the critical factor cited by the court in
distinguishing prior cases that rejected substantive due process claims.74
The Third Circuit reaffirmed the importance of a personal motive in
DeBlasio v. Zoning Board of Adjustment."7 It held that the possibility that
a personal financial motive may have influenced the decisionmaking
process was sufficient to support a substantive due process claim under
§ 1983.76
Particularly significant is the fact that the Third Circuit's "arbitrary or
irrational" standard is combined with a broad definition of what
constitutes a protected property right under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather than focusing on whether a property owner has a claim of
entitlement to a permit, the Third Circuit considers the Fourteenth
68. See, e.g., Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 1997);
Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (3d Cir. 1988).
69. See Bituminous Materials, 126 F.3d at 1071.
70. See id. at 1070.
71. See id.
72. 840 F.2d 1124.
73. See id. at 1129.
74. See id.
75. 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1995).
76. See id.
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Amendment's protection to extend to any arbitrary interference with a
landowner's use of property.' The right to a rational land use permitting
process is viewed as one of the inherent rights of property ownership
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
78
In summary, the predominant approaches in the federal circuits are
highly restrictive and consistent with the notion that "[t]he heavy artillery
of constitutional litigation is not available on... an indiscriminate
basis., 79 The circuits generally agree that a valid due process claim under
§ 1983 requires two essential elements: first, there must be a sufficiently
certain property interest at stake to invoke the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment; second, the party making a claim under § 1983
must demonstrate that a property interest was infringed by government
actions more serious than those deemed arbitrary and capricious under
state administrative law. °
D. The Washington Approach to § 1983 Prior to Mission Springs
The Washington Supreme Court has struggled to develop a consistent
approach to § 1983 land use claims. Two very different standards of
analysis have emerged from Washington's line of cases addressing
§ 1983. One set of cases has referenced Seventh Circuit case law and
held that § 1983 is unavailable in land use actions absent "invidious or
irrational" conduct.81 The other approach uses the same standard for due
process that is used in state administrative law, permitting § 1983 claims
based- oh a showing of arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking.82
Although based on a single Washington Supreme Court case, this
approach has found support in state appeals court decisions. 3
77. See id
78. See id.
79. Steuart v. Suskie, 867 F.2d 1148, 1150 (8th Cir. 1989).
80. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text
81. See, e.g., Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 23, 829 P.2d 765, 777 (1992); R/L
Assocs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402,412,780 P.2d 838, 843 (1989).
82. See Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 2d 91, 125, 829 P.2d 746, 763
(1992).
83. See NorquestlRCA-W Bitter Lake Partnership v. City of Seattle, 72 Wash. App. 467,481, 865
P.2d 18,26 (1994).
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1. R/L Associates, Inc. v. City of Seattle: "Invidious or Irrational"
The Washington Supreme Court first considered the application of
§ 1983 to land use claims in R/L Associates, Inc. v. City of Seattle.' This
1989 case appeared to have conclusively recognized the fundamental
distinction between conduct that can give rise to a federal substantive
due process claim under § 1983 and conduct that is merely improper
under state law. The Washington Supreme Court explicitly adopted the
"invidious or irrational" test developed by the Seventh Circuit." Despite
adopting the "invidious or irrational" test, however, the court stressed
that it dismissed the § 1983 claims because there were no allegations of
"arbitrary or capricious" conduct.86
2. Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County: "Arbitrary and
Capricious "
In Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County,87 decided three years
after RIL Associates, the Washington Supreme Court focused on the
"arbitrary or capricious" language from R/L Associates. Disregarding the
previously adopted "invidious or irrational" standard, the court cited the
same "arbitrary and capricious" standard used in the administrative law
context to determine that denial of a conditional use permit violated the
claimant's substantive due process rights.88 No allegation of purposeful
discrimination or knowing or reckless conduct was made.89 Indeed, the
trial court originally dismissed Lutheran Day Care's § 1983 claims
because the lack of knowing or reckless conduct failed to satisfy what the
court believed was a higher standard applicable to the federal cause of
action.' The Washington Supreme Court, however, considered this
blanket finding of arbitrary and capricious conduct sufficient to satisfy
84. 113 Wash. 2d 402, 780 P.2d 838 (1989).
85. See id. at 412, 780 P.2d at 843-44 (citing Harding v. County of Door, 870 F.2d 430, 431 (7th
Cir. 1989); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoff-man Estates, 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988)).
86. See RIL Assocs., 113 Wash. 2d at 412, 780 P.2d at 844.
87. 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746.
88. The trial judge in Lutheran Day Care concluded that denial of the permit constituted "willful
and unreasonable action without consideration and in disregard of the relevant facts and
circumstances." Id. at 97, 829 P.2d at 748-49. This is the definition of "arbitrary and capricious"
used in the state administrative law context. See Department of Corr. v. Personnel Appeals Bd., 92
Wash. App. 484, 490, 967 P.2d 6, 9 (1998).
89. See Lutheran Day Care, 119 Wash. 2d at 98, 829 P.2d at 749.
90. See id. at 125, 829 P.2d at 763.
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not only the claimant's state causes of action, but the federal § 1983
action as well.91
Washington appellate courts interpreting Lutheran Day Care have
likewise concluded that § 1983 claims do not demand a greater showing
than the arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking necessary for an
actionable claim under state law. For example, in Norquest RCA- WBitter
Lake Partnership v. City of Seattle,2 the court relied on Lutheran Day
Care to hold that the arbitrary or capricious standard used in state
administrative law was also applicable to § 1983 land use claims.93 It
noted that if the court in Lutheran Day Care had intended that a higher
standard be applied to § 1983 claims, "it would have likely ordered a
limited remand to determine whether the facts satisfied the new
standard." 94
3. Sintra I: "Invidious or Irrational"
In Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra 1),95 the Washington Supreme
Court further confused the meaning of Lutheran Day Care. Decided on
the same day as Lutheran Day Care, Sintra I involved the City of
Seattle's attempt to exact a financial penalty under Seattle's Housing
Preservation Ordinance after an injunction had been entered against its
continued enforcement.96 Seattle's enforcement of the ordinance, which
required developers to pay a fee when their development actions
eliminated low-income housing, delayed the claimant's efforts to
renovate'a Seattle building, and eventually forced him to default on a
16'in.97 In discussing the availability of money damages, the court
91. See id. at 114-15, 829 P.2d at 757-58.
92. 72 Wash. App. 467, 865 P.2d 18 (1994).
93. The court stated:
[Ain arbitrary and capricious denial of a building or conditional use permit automatically
entitles one to § 1983 damages. Our reading of Lutheran Day Care indicates.., that the
Supreme Court did not modify or replace the traditional arbitrary and capricious standard.
Rather, the court in Lutheran Day Care appears to have established that a finding of arbitrary
and capricious governmental conduct under the traditional standard is sufficient, by itself, to
violate substantive due process.
Id at 481, 865 P.2d at 26.
94. Id. at 482, 865 P.2d at 27.
95. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765 (1992).
96. See id. at 8-9, 829 P.2d at 769.
97. See id. at 6, 829 P.2d at 768.
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asserted that a land use decision denies substantive due process for
§ 1983 purposes only if that decision was "invidious or irrational.""8
4. Sintra II: "Invidious or Irrational'" Reaffirmed
In Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra 11),99 the conflict between
Lutheran Day Care and Sintra I was arguably resolved in favor of the
higher standard suggested in Sintra I five years earlier. The Sintra II
court explicitly reaflirmed adherence to the "invidious or irrational"
standard and stressed the importance of looking to federal case law to
determine what constitutes a violation of federal substantive due process
rights."° Sintra I1, however, failed to distinguish the court's quite
different holding in Lutheran Day Care.
In Hayes v. City of Seattle,'"' another land use case decided on the
same day as Sintra 17, Justice Madsen noted in a dissenting opinion the
confusion caused by Lutheran Day Care and criticized the court for
failing to resolve the conflict between the cases." 2 Justice Madsen
suggested that the approach used in Sintra I was more appiopriate and
that federal case law should provide the limiting criteria for determining
the availability of § 1983 in state land use actions. 3
II. MISSION SPRINGS, INC. v. CITY OF SPOKANE
A. Factual Background
Mission Springs, a land development company, submitted an
application for a Planned Unit Development (PUD) to the City of
98. Id. at 23, 829 P.2d at 777.
99. 131 Wash. 2d 640,935 P.2d 555 (1997).
100. See id. at 654, 935 P.2d at 562-63.
101. 131 Wash. 2d 706, 934 P.2d 1179 (1997).
102. Justice Madsen stated:
Recent criticism by the Court of Appeals that, read together, these two decisions create
confusion has some merit .... [Tihis court's analysis in Sintra requiring animus or a deliberate
flouting of the law that trammels significant rights is in line with the approach of most recent
federal decisions. Thus, until such time as the United States Supreme Court speaks to the
contrary, Sintra, not Lutheran Day Care, should be followed by courts of this state.
Id. at 723-24, 934 P.2d at 1188 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
103. See id. (Madsen, J., dissenting).
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Spokane in early 1992.'04 The City approved the PUD master plan in
August 1992 together with the required grading and building permits. 05
Mission Springs, however, failed to use the building permits before they
lapsed. In October 1994 the company submitted new applications, which
became the subject of the Mission Springs case." 6 On June 22, 1995,
Spokane's building officer informed the city council that the city was
ready to issue the grading permit."° The city council, however, in
response to complaints by citizen groups about possible project-related
traffic problems, voted to instruct the city building officer to delay
issuance of the permit until completion of a traffic study."8
Under the applicable Spokane Municipal Code, the administrative
function of issuing building permits was vested in administrative staff to
the exclusion of the city council."° Yet it was the city council that took
the action that led to delay of the permits. ° In an exchange between city
council members and the City Attorney, quoted prominently in the
Mission Springs decision, the council members disregarded the advice of
the attorney that instructing the building officer not to issue the permits
would constitute a charter violation.' However, the city council
104. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 952-53, 954 P.2d 250, 252
(1998).
105. See id.
106. Seeki.
107. See id. at 954, 954 P.2d at 253.
108. See id. at 955-56, 954 P.2d at 253-54.
109. See id. at 970 n.17, 954 P.2d at 261 n.17.
110. See id at 955-56, 954 P.2d at 253-54.
111. The court quoted from the City Council proceedings:
(Council Member Phyllis] Holmes: If we were to direct Bob [Eugene] not to issue permits until
the tunnels were improved, what would happen?
[City Attorney James] Sloan: What would happen is that it would be the genesis of a cause of
action by the developer against the city for unlawfully interfering with the issuance of a building
permit and that is... a civil rights violation. The other issue is that it's a charter violation.
[Council Member Holmes]: Well, I'm going to put a motion on the table and see where we go
with this. I'm going to move that we request a current staff report on the traffic impact on the
Thorpe tunnels of the additional units based on current traffic use. If there are any studies that
we have would be old [sic] and we delay issuance of that pennit until that report has been
brought forward to the county.
[Council Member Anderson]: You know, I guess I would add that... we owe an obligation to
the other members ofthe community who have serious concerns about the traffic problems up in
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members felt an obligation to the community to study the development's
impact on traffic before permitting the project to proceed further." 2
B. Holding and Analysis
The Washington Supreme Court, in a six-to-two opinion, held that the
City of Spokane's decision to delay issuance of Mission Springs's
building and grading permits violated Mission Springs's federal
substantive due process rights. 1 3 The majority opinion utilized an
"arbitrary or irrational" test, relying largely on the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Bateson v. Geisse."4 Both the court's discussion of what
property rights are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection, and the
court's definition of its "arbitrary or irrational" standard, are significant.
1. Property Rights
In contrast to its previous cases, the Washington Supreme Court
focused significant attention on the type of property rights that are
entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority
opinion concluded that Mission Springs had a constitutionally protected
property right in the permits it sought, due to the City Council's previous
approval of its Planned Unit Development." 5 Once PUD approval is
obtained, the developer has a right to build to the previously approved
specifications unless the legislative body finds that a change in
conditions creates a serious threat to the public health or safety in the
subdivision."6 The court determined that Mission Springs had satisfied
that area .... I guess too my feeling is, and I think this is a great motion. We have the
opportunity to put a stop to this and let's just see what happens. Let's see how confident they
are. If they bring a suit, we can always turn around and issue the permit, that's an option still
available to us.
Id. at 955-56, 954 P.2d at 254-55 (emphasis in original).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 950, 954 P.2d 250.
114. See id. at 970, 954 P.2d at 261.
115. See id. at 958-59 n.12, 954 P.2d at 255 n.12 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 58.17.033: "A
proposed division of land ... shall be considered under the subdivision or short subdivision
ordinance, and zoning or other land use control ordinances, in effect on the land at the time a fully
completed application for preliminary plat approval... has been submitted....").
116. See id. at 958-59,954 P.2d at 255 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 58.17.170).
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all of the statutory criteria for issuance of the permits and was thus
entitled to the permits as a matter of right.117
The court suggested, however, that a property right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment could be found upon a much lesser showing than
that purportedly demonstrated in Mission Springs. The majority opinion
cited Ninth Circuit case law for the proposition that property rights are
created whenever limits are placed on a decisionmaker's discretion to
deny a permit or license.11 Moreover, there is some suggestion in
Mission Springs that the right to use and develop property free from
arbitrary conduct in the permitting process is itself a property right
worthy of Fourteenth Amendment protection."'
2. "Arbitrary or Irrational" Standard
The Mission Springs decision did not specifically mention either the
"arbitrary or capricious" standard of Lutheran Day Care or the
"invidious or irrational" test affirmed in Sintra II. Rather, the court cited
the Ninth Circuit's Bateson decision for the proposition that "arbitrary or
irrational" conduct in the permit issuance process violates a party's
federal substantive due process rights. 20 The court did not, however, rely
on Bateson to define the contours of its new standard. Instead, it turned
to Black's Law Dictionary to define "irrational" as "[u]nreasonable,
foolish, illogical, absurd.''
Applying this test in practice, the court noted that two key aspects of
the city council's actions as violating the rationality standard. First, the
city council's involvement in the administrative process-by directing
the City Manager to withhold issuance of the permits-violated local
law." Second, the court found that the failure to issue the permits
despite prior PUD approval was a violation of state law." Although the
court noted that the rejection of the City Attorney's legal advice was an
117. See id. at 959, 954 P.2d at 255.
118. See id. at 963, 954 P.2d at'257 (citing Jacobsen v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir.
1980)).
119. See id. at 962, 954 P.2d at 257 (citing Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928)
("The right to use and enjoy land is a property right.")).
120. See id. at 970,954 P.2d at 261.
121. Id (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 829 (6th ed. 1990) (alteration in original)).
122. See ia at 970-71,954 P.2d at 261.
123. See id. at 971, 954 P.2d at 261.
Washington Law Review
aggravating factor, the court held that the city council's failure to adhere
to local and state procedural law objectively satisfied the irrationality
requirement.
124
III. THE FAILURE OF MISSION SPRINGS TO ADOPT THE
STRICT FEDERAL APPROACH LEAVES AN
INAPPROPRIATE, BROAD, AND CONFUSED STANDARD
Mission Springs is an unfortunate development in Washington's
approach to land use claims brought under § 1983. The "arbitrary or
irrational" inquiry of Mission Springs cannot be reconciled with the
"invidious or irrational" inquiry that the court reaffirmed only one year
previously in Sintra 11. In Mission Springs, the Washington Supreme
Court combined a vague and apparently broad definition of what
property rights are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment with a
lenient standard regarding the type of conduct that can violate an
individual's federal due process rights. The resulting analysis permits
precisely what the federal circuits strive to prevent: namely, the
transformation of essentially state law issues into federal constitutional
claims. Moreover, in adopting this analysis the Mission Springs court
missed an opportunity to introduce much-needed consistency into its
treatment of § 1983 land use actions.
A. The Failure ofMission Springs to Reconcile Prior Decisions
Leaves the Substantive Due Process Standard in Doubt
In the wake of Mission Springs, perhaps the greatest deficiency in
Washington's treatment of § 1983 remains the lack of a consistent
standard specifying what must be demonstrated to establish that a
landowner's federal substantive due process rights were denied. Rather
than harmonizing the conflicting standards in the RIL Associates line of
cases, Mission Springs introduced yet another new standard for § 1983
land use claims."z Not only did the court again fail to explain its prior
holding in Lutheran Day Care, but it also ignored the "invidious or
124. See id.
125. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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irrational" standard that was explicitly reaffirmed only one year earlier in
Sintra If. 126
Although the court in Mission Springs did not explicitly overrule prior
cases applying the "invidious or irrational" standard, the court declined
to draw from this line of cases when it adopted the new "arbitrary or
irrational" standard. Rather, the Mission Springs court turned to the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Bateson v. Geisse.27 The court referred to the
Bateson decision as "the leading and controlling case in this area," and
suggested that "similar facts and identical law mandate the same
result. 12 8 However, despite the fact that Bateson dates back to 1988,
only once previously had the court cited its "arbitrary or irrational"
standard, equating it with the Seventh Circuit's "invidious or irrational"
test.
129
Reliance on Bateson resulted in a markedly different approach to
Washington's treatment of § 1983 land use claims. The Seventh Circuit's
"invidious or irrational" standard required that an action be as egregious
as race-based decisionmaking to violate a property owner's substantive
due process rights. 3" The court in Mission Springs, however, concluded
that the plaintiff's substantive due process rights were violated when the
City of Spokane improperly delayed issuance of land use permits just six
weeks for an inquiry into public safety issues."' The disparity between
the "invidious or irrational" approach and the holding in Mission Springs
questions the utility of any standard offered by the Washington Supreme
Court as a means of predicting what conduct can support a § 1983 action.
B. Mission Springs's "Arbitrary or Irrational" Test Fails to
Incorporate the Lessons ofFederal Case Law
The "arbitrary or irrational" test that emerges from Mission Springs
fails to respect the central principles that have evolved as federal circuits
have evaluated § 1983 land use claims. Mission Springs does not limit
126.' See Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra 11), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 654, 935 P.2d 555, 562-63
(1997) (reaffirming court's commitment to "invidious or irrational" standard).
127. See Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 970, 954 P.2d at 261 (citing Bateson v. Geisse, 857
F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988)).
128. Ma at 968, 954 P.2d at 260.
129. See Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34,60-61, 830 P.2d 318,334 (1992).
130. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461,467-68 (7th Cir. 1988).
131. See Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 975, 954 P.2d at 263.
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§ 1983 to those actions that are egregiously bad or "truly irrational."' 13 2
Neither does the "arbitrary or irrational" test recognize that the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection does not extend to all aspects of
property ownership.'33 In rejecting the lessons of federal case law,
Mission Springs's "arbitrary or irrational" test ignores the "overriding
precept" that conduct violative of an individual's substantive due process
rights must be on an entirely different level than that required to set aside
an administrative decision as arbitrary or capricious. 134
1. "Arbitrary or Irrational'" Conduct Is Broadly Defined
To violate Washington's "arbitrary or irrational" test, conduct need
only be "[u]nreasonable, foolish, illogical, [or] absurd."'135 The restrictive
standards that have evolved in the federal circuits are premised on
precisely the opposite conclusion: substantive due process does not
encompass government action that is simply wrong or ill-advised. 36
Rather, the federal circuits have extended due process protection to
challenged land use actions only when the decisionmaking is so far
removed from that which is permissible as to be "truly irrational" or
"shocking to the conscience."' 3 7 In the federal circuits, action does not
reach this level unless it is based on factors unrelated to any permissible
zoning goals. 38 The Seventh Circuit's suggestion that only something
akin to race-based decisionmaking could violate substantive due process
indicates the type of violation required to implicate a party's federal
substantive due process rights. 39 Likewise, the Eight Circuit's examples
of using zoning power to punish a political opponent or to protect one's
own business from competition are also very different than violating
state law to investigate a potential traffic hazard. 140 In all of the federal
132. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
135. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 970, 954 P.2d at 261 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 829
(6th ed. 1990)) (alteration in original).
136. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 59, 69-70, and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 40, 63, 67-68, and accompanying text.
139. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461,467-68 (7th Cir. 1988).
140. See Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 1997).
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decisions, there is an element that goes beyond a decision that is merely
"[u]nreasonable, foolish, illogical, [or] absurd.''.
Application of the "arbitrary or irrational" standard to the facts of
Mission Springs yielded an even more unsettling result: violations of
state or local procedural law relating to permit issuance can conclusively
establish the irrationality of the challenged government action.142
Although the court in Mission Springs noted that rejecting the City
Attorney's advice was an aggravating factor, the court stated that
irrationality was "objectively established by departure from the
mandatory legal process."'43 Taken at face value, this statement may
open the door to future § 1983 claims based on little more than
procedural irregularities in the permitting process. Under such a broad
definition of irrationality, it is likely that any official departure from the
mandatory legal process, except perhaps inadvertent administrative
errors, would qualify as a substantive due process violation. The Spokane
City Council was motivated by legitimate concerns about traffic safety
when it voted to delay issuance of Mission Springs's permits.'" If
departure from the mandatory legal process in pursuit of legitimate
public safety concerns violates due process, then violation of a statutory
scheme for any other reason arguably would as well.
In so holding, Mission Springs ignored a central tenet of the federal
approach to § 1983: a violation of state or local law is rarely a violation
of an individual's federal due process rights. 45 In many ways, Mission
Springs is similar to the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Love v.
Peppersack.'46 In Peppersack, police officers conducting a firearms
background check refused to issue a firearms permit despite their
inability to complete a full investigation in the seven-day period
mandated by state law. 47 The Peppersack court held that such a violation
of state law in pursuit of legitimate public safety goals was not a
141. Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 970, 954 P.2d 250, 261 (1998)
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 829 (6th ed. 1990)) (alteration in original).
142. See id. at 971, 954 P.2d at 261.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 956, 954 P.2d at 254.
145. See, e.g., Bituminous Materials, 126 F.3d at 1070; Tri County Indus., Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffinan Estates, 844
F.2d 461,467 (7th Cir. 1988).
146. 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995).
147, See id. at 122.
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violation of substantive due process. 4 The Fourth Circuit noted that
state courts exist to address the misapplication of state law and that to
hold otherwise would trivialize the Due Process Clause.
49
2. Mission Springs Suggests That a Broad Range of Property Rights
Are Subject to Fourteenth Amendment Protection
The danger in so loosely defining the type of conduct that can support
a finding of a due process violation is enhanced by the court's broad
definition of what property rights are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mission Springs cites the Ninth Circuit's Bateson decision
for the proposition that property rights are present in the permit issuance
process whenever there are limits on the discretion of the issuing
authority. 5° It is significant to note, however, that the Bateson decision
stated that a "legitimate claim of entitlement" is required to confer
property rights.' The Bateson decision involved an ordinance in which
issuance of a land use permit was mandatory upon the satisfaction of
specific criteria." 2 The Bateson court's discussion of the significance of
discretion in the decisionmaking process was primarily mentioned as a
reason for dismissing one of Bateson's other claims. 53 The California
Court of Appeals has interpreted Bateson to mean that any discretion in
the permit application process is sufficient to negate the existence of a
property right."5
This is particularly significant with respect to the Mission Springs
decision because the court appears to conclude that the discretion of
municipal officials to respond to legitimate public health and safety
issues is insufficient to negate a claim of entitlement in a sought-after
permit.55 RCW 58.17.170 permits planning authorities to alter the terms
of a previously approved planned unit development if "the legislative
body finds that a change in conditions creates a serious threat to the
148. See id. at 123.
149. Seeld
150. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 963, 954 P.2d 250, 257
(1998) (citing Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (1988)).
151. Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1305 (1988).
152 See id at 1303.
153. See id at 1305.
154. See Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223,240 (1996).
155. See Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 965, 954 P.2d at 259.
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public health or safety in the subdivision.' 56 The right to respond to
public health and safety concerns injects significant discretion into the
permitting process. In Mission Springs, the court admitted the existence
of this discretion, noting that denial of the permits would have been
acceptable if the city council had first repealed its earlier approval of
Mission Springs's PUD in response to a finding of changed conditions.'57
Under the Second Circuit's "clear entitlement" test, the ability of
planning authorities to deny a permit application on any legitimate
ground is sufficient to negate the existence of a property right protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.158 Whether the ability of planning
authorities to deny permits based on public health concerns would negate
the existence of a "legitimate claim of entitlement" in the Ninth Circuit is
at least an open question."9
C. The Cases Cited by the Washington Supreme Court Are
Distinguishable from Mission Springs
To the extent that Mission Springs relied upon federal case law in
developing its new standard, that reliance is misplaced. As support for
the "arbitrary or irrational" standard, the majority opinion cited the Third
Circuit's decision in Bello v. Walker in addition to the Ninth Circuit's
Bateson decision."6 Neither of these cases provides an adequate
foundation for the result reached in Mission Springs.
Although the Third Circuit has demonstrated a greater willingness to
extend substantive due process protection to land use claims than other
circuits, the "arbitrary or irrational" standard used in the Third Circuit is
still highly restrictive. 6' Mission Springs cited Bello v. Walker for the
broad proposition that improper interference with the permit issuance
process is arbitrary and violates property owner's substantive due
process rights. 62 The Third Circuit, however, has limited § 1983 to
situations in which the improper interference was motivated by factors
156. Wash. Rev. Code § 58.17.170 (1998).
157. See Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 965, 954 P.2d at 259.
158. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
160. See Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 965, 954 P.2d at 258.
161. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
162. See Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 965, 954 P.2d at 258 (citing Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d
1124,1129 (3d Cir. 1988)).
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unrelated to any legitimate government goals.'63 In Bello, evidence
suggested that the city council withheld permit approval in retaliation for
the political activities of one of Bello's employees."6 The existence of
this personal motive was the critical factor noted by the court in
distinguishing Bello's claim from claims of arbitrary conduct made in
prior, unsuccessful § 1983 actions. 6
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Bateson v. Geisse likewise is
distinguishable from Mission Springs. The plaintiff in Bateson satisfied
all ordinance criteria and, under the applicable municipal code, was
entitled to issuance of his building permit as a matter of right. 66 The city
council not only failed to provide any justification for denial of
Bateson's permit, but also initiated a rezone of Bateson's land to frustrate
his development plans. 67 The effect of the city council's actions was
significant enough that Bateson joined an inverse condemnation claim
with his § 1983 substantive due process claim. 68 In contrast, the Spokane
City Council voted to delay Mission Springs's permits for only six weeks
to determine the effect of the proposed development on public safety
issues. 169 Moreover, Mission Springs's use of Black's Law Dictionary to
define its "arbitrary or irrational" standard resulted in a very different
analysis than that used in Bateson 70 The Ninth Circuit's "arbitrary or
irrational" standard invalidates government action only if it has "no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare."'
17
D. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Substantive Due Process and
§ 1983 Mandates a Stricter Standard
For the Washington Supreme Court's approach to § 1983 land use
claims to be persuasive, the majority opinion must overcome not only the
163. See Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (3d Cir. 1988).
164. See id. at 1127.
165. See id. at 1129-30.
166. See Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1988).
167. See id. at 1302.
168. See id.
169. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 975, 954 P.2d 250, 263
(1998).
170. See supra notes 121, 135, and accompanying text.
171. Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
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contrary positions of the federal circuits, but also the pronounced trend in
federal jurisprudence away from using substantive due process to expand
judicial power.172 The court must demonstrate that the conduct at issue in
Mission Springs "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."17 3 This the court cannot do. Not only has the Supreme
Court strictly limited the application of substantive due process to
economic and property rights,174 but it has likewise distinguished
between the violation of state and constitutional rights in its treatment of
§ 1983.175
1. Application of Substantive Due Process to Property Rights Is
Disfavored
The general judicial caution regarding use of substantive due process
analysis has been applied with enhanced rigor to economic issues. 176
While the protection of private property may have deep historical roots,
arbitrary interference with development rights has not attracted the
attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.177 In describing the Supreme
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, the Ninth Circuit stated in
Armendariz v. Penman that "the use of substantive due process to extend
constitutional protection to economic and property rights has been
largely discredited.' '178 As noted by Justice Talmadge, Armendariz raises
the question of whether Bateson, the case upon which Mission Springs
relies most heavily, is still valid.179 The California Court of Appeals, in a
recent land use case, questioned whether after Armendariz substantive
due process analysis has any application whatsoever in routine land use
172. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) .(describing
Court's attempts to restrict substantive due process to only most fundamental liberty interests).
173. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) (quoting Speisor v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 523 (1958)).
174. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 41-42 (Scalia, L, concurring).
175. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
176. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 41 (Scalia, J., concurring).
177. See Kristiana L. Farris, Note, 'Seeley v. State: The Need for Definitional Balancing in
Washington Substantive Due Process Law, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 669, 677 n.68 (1998) (noting that U.S.
Supreme Court has not entertained substantive due process challenge to land use regulations since
1928).
178. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1996).
179. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 970 n.17, 954 P.2d 250,
271 n.17 (1998) (Talmadge, 3., dissenting).
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cases. '8 Though not deciding this question, the California court resolved
the substantive due process issue using the First Circuit's "shocks the
conscience" standard, ignoring the Bateson decision entirely.18" '
2. Section 1983 Was Intended to Protect Fundamental Rights
The history of § 1983 likewise suggests that the statute was never
contemplated as a means of addressing routine zoning disputes. The
original purpose of § 1983 was to counter the "corrupting influence of
the Ku Klux Klan and its sympathizers on the governments and law
enforcement agencies of the Southern States."' 82 The "Jim Crow" laws
that § 1983 was intended to reach represented flagrant attempts to repress
a group that had been brutally discriminated against and for whom state
law likely did not provide an effective remedy. Although the reach of
§ 1983 has certainly been extended beyond attempts to counter racial
discrimination, the principle that it should address only the infringement
of fundamental rights remains. Justice Harlan noted in Monroe v. Pape
that § 1983 becomes no more than a jurisdictional provision if the
deprivation of a constitutional right is not distinguished from the
violation of a state right.8 3 Violation of the constitutional right is entitled
to a different remedy only because it is by nature of a wholly different
magnitude."'
IV. WASHINGTON SHOULD ADOPT THE "SHOCKS THE
CONSCIENCE" APPROACH TO § 1983 LAND USE CLAIMS
The decision in Mission Springs and the diversity of approaches in the
federal circuits reflect the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
address the application of § 1983 to land use issues. Where the Court has
applied substantive due process to individual government acts, as
opposed to broad legislative enactments, it has used language very
similar to the First Circuit's "shocks the conscience" standard. 8 1
180. See Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 243 (1996).
181. See id. at 244.
182. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174
(1961)).
183. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
184. See id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
185. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 (1998) (involving substantive due
process challenge to high speed police chase that ended in death).
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Adopting this standard in Washington would remedy much of what is
wrong with Washington's approach to § 1983 land use claims without
unduly subordinating the rights of property owners.
A. The "Shocks the Conscience" Standard Is Supported by U.S.
Supreme Court Precedent
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not considered the application
of substantive due process to a challenged land use decision since 1928,
the Court has entertained substantive due process challenges to both
executive and legislative action.'86 In accord with its reluctance to
invalidate legislative decisions on substantive due process grounds,8 7 the
Court noted in County of Sacramento v. Lewis that only the most
egregious executive misconduct is arbitrary in the constitutional sense. 88
The Lewis court held that the relevant level "of executive abuse of power
is that which shocks the conscience. ' '8 9
'he holding in Lewis reaffirmed the Court's earlier decision in Collins
v. City of Harker Heights.9 ' Collins involved a claim that the city's
failure to properly train city personnel could implicate an employee's
substantive due process rights.' 91 In rejecting this claim, the Court noted
that "arbitrary" in the constitutional sense means something different
than in other contexts."9 The Court was not persuaded that "the city's
alleged failure to train its employees . . [could] be properly
characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional
sense."
193
While neither Collins nor Lewis involved a challenge to the type of
state administrative decisions at issue in zoning cases, they do provide
insight into how the U.S. Supreme Court might approach this type of
problem. The plaintiffs in Mission Springs and similar cases usually
allege a violation of their substantive due process rights based on the
186. See Farris, supra note 177, at 677 n.68.
187. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting Court's
attempts to limit substantive due process to certain fundamental liberty interests).
188. SeeLewis, 118S. Ct. at 1712.
189. Id.
190. 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Id.
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assumption that substantive due process protects against arbitrary
application of government power.19' Both Collins and Lewis established,
however, that the question of whether government action is arbitrary in
the constitutional sense is an extremely narrow inquiry.'95 To be
invalidated as arbitrary on substantive due process grounds, government
conduct must literally "shock the conscience."' 196 The Supreme Court
thus provides compelling evidence that the First Circuit is correct in
using a "shocks the conscience" standard to delineate between conduct
that is arbitrary enough to violate the constitution and conduct merely
improper under state law.
B. Adopting the "Shocks the Conscience" Standard Would Provide
Consistency Without Subordinating Property Rights
Through adoption of the "shocks the conscience" test, the Washington
Supreme Court can remedy the primary defects in Washington's
approach to § 1983 without sacrificing the rights of property owners.
While a bright line rule is seldom possible in substantive due process
analysis, adherence to a strict standard would provide the consistency
that has been lacking in Washington's treatment of § 1983 land use
actions. The "shocks the conscience" test would bring Washington into
step with federal case law and preserve the fundamental distinction
between issues that should be resolved under state law and misconduct
which is egregious enough to implicate an individual's federal
constitutional rights.
Although adoption of the "shocks the conscience" test would sig-
nificantly restrict the availability of § 1983, property owners would still
have an adequate remedy in routine zoning disputes. RCW 64.40.020
empowers parties to seek damages against permitting authorities for
conduct that is "arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or exceed[s] lawful
authority.' 97 While RCW 64.40.020 does not authorize damages against
decisionmakers in their individual capacities, it does provide for the
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. 198 RCW 64.40.020
194. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 970, 254 P.2d 250, 261
(1998); see also Creative Env'ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982).
195. See supra notes 188, 189, 192-93, and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 189, 193, and accompanying text.
197. Wash. Rev. Code § 64.40.020(1) (1998).
198. Wash. Rev. Code § 64.40.020(2) (1998).
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provides clearer and more appropriate guidelines to examine land use
decisions than does the notion of substantive due process. The arbitrary
or capricious standard embodied in RCW 64.40.020 explicitly guards
against the type of conduct at issue in Mission Springs." Restricting
litigation of routine zoning disputes to RCW 64.40.020 would maintain
the paramount distinction between conduct that is improper under state
law and conduct that violates rights protected by the federal constitution.
C. Application of the "Shocks the Conscience" Test to Washington
Case Law
Applying the "shocks the conscience" standard, neither the Lutheran
Day Care nor Mission Springs courts should have found a violation of
the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. The plaintiff in Lutheran
Day Care was three times denied a building permit as a result of conduct
that the trial court found did not constitute willful discrimination or even
reckless conduct.2 °0 The defendant council members in Mission Springs
acted based on legitimate concerns about traffic safety.20 ' Neither of
these cases presented an invidious motivation or the shocking abuse of
power that would make these actions arbitrary in the constitutional sense.
The presence of a suspect class may not be a prerequisite to finding a
§ 1983 violation under the "shocks the conscience" standard; however
the examples of race-based decisionmaking or using zoning laws to
protect one's,,-business from competition, demonstrate the level of
irrationality that must be demonstrated to find a § 1983 violation.20 2
The City of Seattle's actions in Sintra I more closely approach the
level of a substantive due process violation.2 3 The City of Seattle sought
payment of a fee under its Housing Preservation Ordinance despite the
fact that an injunction had been entered against its continued
enforcement.2" In requiring payment of more than $200,000 as a
199. The court in Mission Springs upheld a finding that RCW 64.40.020 was violated as well as
§ 1983. The court awarded attorney fees, which constituted the bulk of Mission Springs's, recovery
without distinguishing between the rights provided by the respective statutes. See Mission Springs,
134 Wash. 2d at 972, 954 P.2d at 262.
200. See Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 2d 91, 98, 829 P.2d 746, 749
(1992).
201. See Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 956,954 P.2d at 254.
202. See Creative Env'ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982).
203. See Sintra Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765 (1992).
204. See i. at 9-10, 829 P.2d at 769-70.
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condition of processing Sintra's land use applications, the city abused its
monopoly over land use authority to Sintra's significant detriment.0 5
Moreover, in contrast to the public safety concerns that motivated the
City of Spokane, the sole intent of the City of Seattle was to assure
payment of a fee.20 6 This fundamental abuse of permitting authority for
reasons unrelated to any legitimate land use goal approaches the level of
using zoning power for political purposes or some other examples the
federal circuits have given of "truly irrational" action.20 7 Whether or not
the City of Seattle's actions could be characterized as conscience
shocking, the conduct at issue was markedly different from that of the
"run of the mill" zoning case.
V. CONCLUSION
The need for the Washington Supreme Court to adopt a clear and
consistent approach to § 1983 land use actions is readily apparent. The
line of cases concerning what constitutes a denial of substantive due
process for purposes of § 1983 applies numerous and often contradictory
standards that fail to clearly define what is necessary to state a claim
under § 1983. The Mission Springs decision continues the inconsistency
in this line of cases, returning Washington to a standard reminiscent of
that espoused in Lutheran Day Care. Not only is the scope of property
rights subject to Fourteenth Amendment protection broad under Mission
Springs, but the range of conduct that can violate substantive due process
is likewise expansive.
Section 1983 provides greatly enhanced remedies because it
recognizes a fundamental distinction between conduct that is merely
improper under state law, and that which is egregious enough to violate
the federal constitution. The application of § 1983 to land use issues
must be considered with reference to the vast body of federal case law
restricting the use of substantive due process analysis. The use of
substantive due process to expand judicial power has been discredited in
large part because, as Washington's experience with § 1983
demonstrates, it is difficult to develop coherent standards to guide
judicial action. The federal circuits have recognized this fact in their
application of § 1983 to land use actions and have limited its application
205. See id. at 7-8, 829 P.2d at 768-69.
206. See id.
207. See Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997).
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to those instances in which fundamental rights are truly at stake. In most
cases, Washington law should be more than adequate to address
improper zoning decisions. Adopting the "shocks the conscience" test
would bring Washington into conformity with federal case law and
reserve § 1983 for situations that truly implicate fundamental
constitutional rights.
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